THE PROBLEM OF THE CONCEPT OF “AUTHOR” IN SOCIO-PHILOSOPHICAL DISCOURSES REGARDING GENERATIVE ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
Keywords:
society, philosophy of copyright, artificial intelligence, text generators, author, authorship, digital author, concept of defining authorshipAbstract
The article explores the problem of authorship in the era of rapid development of artificial intelligence and digital technologies. Given the growing ability of algorithms to independently generate texts, images, and other objects of intellectual activity, a fundamental philosophical question arises: can AI be recognized as the author of a work, and can its creations possess the legal status of creative results? The study analyzes contemporary philosophical and legal approaches to the notion of authorship, comparing classical concepts of creativity with emerging forms of digital co-creation that arise in human-algorithm interaction. Special attention is devoted to the concept of the “digital author” as a new sociocultural phenomenon that unites human intention, intuition, and ethical responsibility with the machine’s capacity for data processing and content generation. It is argued that artificial intelligence, lacking consciousness, self-reflection, and value motivation, cannot be regarded as a subject of copyright. Instead, it should be viewed as an instrument of collective or hybrid creativity, in which the decisive role remains with the human being – the bearer of moral and legal responsibility. The relevance of the topic lies in the need to rethink traditional notions of authorship, intellectual property, and the limits of human creativity, as well as to reconsider the very nature of the creative act in the digital age. The research combines philosophical analysis of the concepts of “creativity” and “consciousness” with the legal issues of authorship recognition. The approaches proposed in the article aim to develop a new concept of authorship under conditions of social and cultural algorithmization, where the preservation of humanistic principles and the understanding of creativity as an expression of human freedom become central.
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