THE ARCHE PROBLEM IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF HAIMO HOFMEISTER (FROM THE MILETUS SCHOOL TO PLATO)

Abstract

The article analyzes the classic work of the famous modern German philosopher Haimo Hofmeister "Think philosophically" («Hofmeister H. Philosophisch denken»), which is devoted to the search for the foundation of all knowledge and all that exists. The methodological framework of the article is to reveal the logic of the author's book, which presents the question of the beginning, arche as a core, fundamental problem of philosophy from the beginning of its emergence to the present day. The cornerstone idea of this article is formulated, which consists in the statement that, according to the German thinker, philosophy, which from the beginning of its origin in Ancient Greece, in accordance with the nature of philosophical thinking, formulated the fundamental problem of finding the beginning, arche, in the course of its development and corresponding expansion and the deepening of the spectrum of problems faced by it gradually lost its natural purpose to a certain extent. Thus, a kind of paradox arose: the fragmentation of problems and the enrichment of the results of philosophical reflections with each era further distanced researchers from the problem of the beginning, which provided for a holistic explanation of the world and the person himself in it. In this context, the main motive of the author is shown, which is to determine the loss of the worldview function of philosophy, which does not allow a modern person with his value orientations to realize the integrity of the world and his purpose in it. The nodal points of origin and development of the problem of principle, arche, defined by H. Hofmeister, starting from the justification of its material nature and ending with Plato's eidos, idea as a spiritual principle, are sequentially traced. In particular, the limitations of the conclusions of the representatives of the Miletus philosophical school about the beginning, arche as a certain substance and the logical justification of the indefinite and unlimited apeiron of Anaximander, which was replaced by the Heraclitean concept of the beginning, arche as becoming, which was rejected by Parmenides with his idea of permanent and unchanging being, which moreover, it is identical to thinking. The article ends with Plato's concept of eidos, idea as a beginning, arche, which is a kind of summary of previous ideas, and therefore a kind of completion of the initial period in search of the foundation of all knowledge and all that exists.